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Abstract 
 
Investment arbitrations should not happen too often, because they are costly processes 
for both parties. Yet they regularly happen. Why? We investigate the hypothesis that 
investment arbitrations are used as a means of last resort, after dissuasion has failed, 
and that dissuasion is most likely to fail in situations where significant political risk 
materializes. Investment arbitration should thus tend to target countries in which high- 
political risk has materialized. In order to test this hypothesis, we focus in this article 
on two drivers of political risk: bad governance and economic crises. We test various 
links between these two drivers of risk and arbitration claims. We use an original data-set 
that includes investment claims filed under the rules of all arbitration institutions as well 
as ad hoc arbitrations. We find that bad governance, understood as corruption and lack 
of rule of law (using the WGI Corruption and WGI Rule of Law indexes), has a 
statistically significant relation with investment arbitration claims, but economic crises 
do not. 
Introduction
Since the mid-nineties, international investment arbitration has become a regular tool used by investors
to settle disputes with host countries. Whereas its use remained almost absent from the radar from
the first case in 1972 to 1995, it has since then quickly risen to an average of more 30 cases a year
in the 2000s. It has even reached record numbers in 2012 and 2013 with respectively 60 and 69 new
cases (UNCTAD 2012, 2013). According to our own account, we have now more than 775 cases of
investment arbitration. Furthermore, the number of countries that have been targeted by arbitration
is on the rise, both in the developing and developed worlds, to reach more than 100 countries.
Investment arbitration is heavy artillery. It has potentially very large financial implications for
the host state of the investment: in three closely related awards, an investment arbitral tribunal
recently ordered Russia to pay over US$ 50 billion in compensation to the former shareholders of the
Yukos Oil Company.1 For investors too it is not an option resorted to lightly. For large cases, the
costs of legal counsel can easily reach several million US$. In the Yukos case just mentioned, the
claimants indicated that their costs for legal representation exceeded US$ 80 million, and the cost of
the arbitration itself (arbitrator fees, fees of the institution and other attendant costs) amounted to
nearly e 8.5 million. More importantly, filing an investment arbitration against a foreign government
is often a cause of divorce, seeing the investor leaving the country. In that sense, investment arbitration
could be considered as a means of last resort in the set of tools to remedy investment disputes, used
when other means have either failed to prevent harmful state policies and decisions or to redress them.
Given the costs mentioned above, it may look more like a means of destruction with potential large
collateral damage.
This sorry state of a↵airs has stimulated a vivid debate in the policy community, where the anger
of those preoccupied by the fate of developing nations is easily discernible.2 The perception that
investment arbitration is a powerful sword in the hands of the economic interests of the North, which
use it to harm the weaker economies of the South, has led to a severe backlash against the current
regime of investment arbitration.3 Those leaning on the side of investors tend to respond that the
rise of investment arbitration merely signals the maturing of an instrument that allows investors to
force governments to abide by their obligations: investment arbitration would be nothing more than a
shield against illegal state interference, and the protection o↵ered by that shield is simply progressively
improving.4 Investment arbitration would, then, do nothing more than fulfill a legitimate societal
function.
Against this background, we have investigated in earlier research to what extent investment arbi-
tration fulfills three basic functions distilled from the literature in law: investment arbitration serves
to champion and strengthen the interests of economic powers of the North to the detriment of political
1Occidental Petroleum Corporation v The Republic of Ecuador, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11 (Oct. 5, 2012)
2Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law, OUP 2007, 17. David Schneiderman, Constitutional-
izing Economic Globalization, CUP, 2008.
3See, e.g., Osgoode Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, 31 August 2010, Art. 14: states
“should take steps to replace or curtail the use of investment treaty arbitration; and should strengthen their domestic
justice system for the benefit of all citizens and communities, including investors.” See also Michael Waibel, Asha
Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Liz Chung & Claire Balchin (eds.), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration, Kluwer, 2010.
4Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan Schill, “Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory
Actions in the Public Interest - The Concept of Proportionality” in Stephan Schill (ed.), International Investment Law
and Comparative Public Law, OUP, 2010.
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powers of the South; investment arbitration serves to strengthen or impose the domestic rule of law
in the host state of the investment; and investment arbitration serves to strengthen the international
rule of law.5 Our conclusion was that until the mid-to-late nineties, investment arbitration was used
to a large extent both as a post-colonial instrument to strengthen the economic interests of the North
and as a means to impose the rule of law in non-democratic states with a weak law and order tra-
dition. Since the mid-to-late nineties, investment arbitration seems more oriented towards serving
the function for which most international courts and tribunals are created that is, to strengthen the
international rule of law. (How well it actually serves that function and whether the international
rule of law is necessarily a good thing, regardless of its contents, are of course discrete questions.6) It
is this line of thought on the functions of investment arbitration that we take further in the current
study.
Our starting point is the following puzzle: investment arbitration processes are costly to almost all
of those involved in them (except for the lawyers and the arbitrators, of course). Yet they do happen
quite often indeed. Why? What causes investment arbitrations to happen?
Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons (2006) considered the question in a landmark study. They posited
the following hypothetical: “Theoretically, we should expect . . . arbitrations to be rare, because fully
informed parties should be able to settle ‘out of court’ and avoid litigation costs.”7 In other words,
fully informed parties would not let investment arbitration happen. And the fact that they do happen
often, Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons argued, “indicates information asymmetries” rather than “the
hopelessness of the case[s]”. This may well have bee true in 2006, but then one would expect the
number of cases to go down as investment arbitration becomes better known: information spreads
and information asymmetries become less common. Yet we see precisely the opposite: the number of
investment arbitration cases continues to rise.
We thus consider a di↵erent hypothesis: investment arbitrations are not mainly caused by infor-
mation asymmetries, but by failed dissuasions. It is a means of last resort. Means of last resort are
most likely to be used when the respondent government has little choice or room for maneuver: in
situations where certain types of political risk materializes. This hypothesis corresponds to one of the
main reasons why investment arbitration was initially created: to protect investors against political
risks. 8
The more specific question we ask, then, is whether investment arbitration is more likely to happen
against countries with certain types of political risk. Taking further previous research focus on the
oil & sector, we seek to identify broad contextual conditions, constituting sources of political risk for
investment in countries hosting foreign investment, that make the subsequent use of arbitration more
5Thomas Schultz and Ce´dric Dupont, (2014). “Investment Arbitration: Promoting the rule of law or over-empowering
investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study,” European Journal of International Law, 25(4): 1147-1168.
6See, e.g., Thomas Schultz, “Against Consistency in Investment Arbitration,” in Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn
and Jorge E. Vin˜uales (eds.), The Foundations of International Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice, OUP,
2014.
7Elkins, Zachary, A. T. Guzman, and B. Simmons. (2006). “Competing for capital: The di↵usion of bilateral
investment treaties, 1960-2000.” International Organization 60(4): 811-846 (emphasis added).
8Political risks, here, are taken in their broad meaning as “government actions which deny or restrict the right
of an investor/owner (i) to use or benefit from his/her assets; or (ii) which reduce the value of the firm”, as put by
Kathryn Gordon, “Investment Guarantees and Political Risk Insurance”. Technical report, Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Paris, 2008, p. 92.
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frequent.9
A parallel can be made with the trade literature. There has indeed been significant discussion in
the IPE literature on trade protectionism regarding the behavior of governments in the current world
economic situation and the legality of domestic economic choices in an era of deep interdependence:
a relevant aspect, for our paper, of that discussion is the debate on whether the “protectionist dog”
(Wolfe 2012) has barked or not. Given the absence of a clear definition of what such a protectionist
dog exactly is and the fact that the barking may take place in a very noisy environment, that debate
is still open. In the field of international investment, our overall understanding of the behavior of
states faces similar obstacles: the barking is in most cases very di cult to hear given its very focused
spectrum. Harmful state actions may only a↵ect one investor, something unlikely to happen in trade.
Unlike Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons, we consider that the occurrence of investment arbitration may
indicate that there was some serious barking in the recent past that could not be stopped in a less
intrusive way (without shooting at the dog as it were). This would suggest some similarity to states
resorting to the WTO DSM to address loud and long barking by the protectionist dog.
The paper is structured as follows: we begin with a brief discussion of two cases of investment
arbitration that we consider to be responses to the realization of di↵erent typical situations of political
risk. Drawing from these cases and the literature, we then turn to a conceptualization of political risk
and develop theoretical propositions linking two particular situations of risk and the use of investment
arbitration. We then discuss our research design, present the empirical results and conclude.
Arbitration and political risk: two short stories
In the 1990s, a Canadian company called Banro was mining for gold and tin in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. Towards the end of that decade, the Congolese government decided to increase
its share of revenues from these raw materials. It implemented that decision by taking a number of
measures that significantly decreased the value of Banros interests in the country. Banro tried to fight
the government through international legal channels. One of its important advisors in this regard was
a lawyer named Patrick Mitchell. Albeit a US national, he was operating a small legal advisory firm
based in Congo, called Mitchell & Associates.
The firm was successful in advising Banro, and thus in attracting the ire of the Congolese gov-
ernment. Among other things, Mitchell & Associates obtained a court order in South Africa that
confirmed Banro’s ownership of a significant shipment of tin en route from Cape Town to a processing
facility in Malaysia. Infuriated by the presence of such competent lawyers within its territory who
defend foreign interests, the Congolese government arrested two employees of Mitchell & Associates
and placed them on trial for high treason, alleging a threat to state security. The o ces of Mr Mitchell
were ransacked and sealed by the Congolese authorities. His business was destroyed.
In response, M. Mitchell took legal action against the government: he filed, in 1999, an investment
arbitration under the aegis of the World Banks International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes against the DRC. He alleged that he had been expropriated of his investment in the law
9Ce´dric Dupont, Thomas Schultz, Melanie R. Wahl and Merih Angin, (2015). “Types of Political Risk Leading to
Investment Arbitrations in the Oil and Gas Sector,” Journal of World Energy Law & Business, 8(4): 337-361.
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firm. After 8 months of imprisonment, his employees were released.
Arguably, M. Mitchell had experienced the materialization of a certain type of political risk: a
blunt disregard of the rule of law. Investment arbitration was the tool he used to respond to it
(unsuccessfully, in the end, but for idiosyncratic legal reasons).10
Between the early 1970s and 1991, Argentina su↵ered eight major currency crises. But in 1991, a
radically new economic plan was introduced, which would reduce trade barriers, deregulate industries,
privatize government-owned entities including in certain public utility sectors, and peg the Argentine
peso to the US dollar.
As part of these e↵orts, the government passed the 1992 Gas Law, which allowed the privatization
of Gas del Estado S.E., with its two transportation and eight distribution companies. CMS Gas
Transmission Company, incorporated in the USA, acquired part of the shareholdings.11 For many
years, its collaboration with the Argentine government went well.
But in January 2002, an economic crisis brought Argentina to its knees: the government defaulted
on its US$ 80 billion foreign debt. One of the measures Argentina took to alleviate the worst of the
crisis was to unpeg the peso from the US dollar: in a matter of five months, the value of the Argentine
peso dropped by nearly 70 per cent compared to the US dollar. The Argentine government froze all
utility rates by enacting an ‘economic emergency law’, which also terminated the right of privatized
gas transportation and distribution companies to charge tari↵s calculated in US dollars, requiring
them to renegotiate the agreements according to the new exchange rate regime.12 CMS unsheathed
the international sword: it filed an investment arbitration against Argentina, as did dozens of other
foreign investors, invoking the provisions of the USArgentina Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).
Arguably, CMS had experienced the materialization of a second type of political risk: a disregard
of the rule of law driven by financial crises, or more generally by economic slowdowns pushing gov-
ernments to take measures that harm foreign investors. Once again, investment arbitration was the
tool the company used to respond to the materialization of this political risk.
While there are clear cases in which investment arbitration was used to respond to the materi-
alization of certain political risks, is this really a typical use of investment arbitration? Are there
correlation between political risks and the use of investment arbitration? Are certain dimensions of
political risks, such as the two identified above, related to and revealed by the use of investment arbi-
tration? Is the role of investment arbitration to react to or to prevent the realization of such political
risks? What do we learn about political risks by studying the history of investment arbitration, from
1972-2014? These are the questions that underlie this paper.
10Investment Treaty News (ITN), November 24, 2006.
11Jose´ E Alvarez and Kathryn Khamsi, ‘The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into the Heart of
the Investment Regime’ in Karl P Sauvant (ed), The Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2008/2009
(OUP 2009) 388.
12ibid 389-90.
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Political risk and investment arbitration: theoretical proposi-
tions
The two brief stories on arbitration cases targeting the DRC and Argentina suggest a typology of
political risk with three facets. This section conceptualizes this typology and then proposes hypothetic
links with the use of investment arbitration.
A parsimonious view on political risk
The notion of political risk is central to the legal, political and economic literature on international
investments. Yet its precise contours remain unclear and no consensus has been reached on its def-
inition. This allows us to elaborate our own conceptualization of political risk. It builds upon two
strands of literature.
The first strand is the practitioner-oriented literature on investment law. Political risk, in this
strand, encompasses a relatively loose array of both specific government measures harming an investors
rights and various other types of hazards that have a political component. Rubins and Kinsella (2005),
for instance, o↵er the following list: a) expropriation, nationalization and confiscation; b) regulatory
interference; c) currency risk; d) civil disturbance; e) breach of state contracts; f) corruption; g) trade
restrictions.13
Second, we draw upon the literature on states’ reactions to situation of economic di culties, fa-
mously captured by the notion of “politics in hard times.”14 Gourevitch (1986), for instance, identifies
a range of broad policy options available to governments to respond to severe crises, including na-
tionalization and protectionism.15 Both options are likely to have an impact on foreign investors.
This literature includes a review of a range of domestic and international factors explaining the choice
among the various policy options.
Our conceptualization of political risk focuses on broad conditions that lead to the materialization
of political risk as distilled from the literature mentioned above. We identify the two following con-
ditions: a) severe economic conditions; b) poor governance, such as public corruption, lack of respect
of rule of law, lack of transparency and no respect for individual rights. Those two sets of conditions
rarely, if ever, exist in pure, isolated form, but occur in combinations of varying degrees of intensity.
Linking political risk and arbitration
Governance and arbitration
Investment arbitration may be used to respond to a first type of political risk: governance issues.
By governance issues, we mean situations in which governments simply run roughshod over treaty
or contract obligations, over international law or their own domestic law. Put di↵erently, these are
circumstances in which public powers are exercised by states in a way that unduly interferes with a
13Noah Rubins and N. Stephan Kinsella. International Investment, Political Risk and Dispute Resolution. A Prac-
titioner’s Guide. Oxford University Press (2005). pp 5-25.
14Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times, Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises. Ithaca,
Cornell University Press (1986).
15Ibid.
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foreign investment in plain, blunt disregard of legal obligations. Such situations correspond to a weak
rule of law, in the sense that “the rule of law is distinguished from regimes of administrative command
and control, where ‘arbitrary’ state action prevails. Law is the instrument that gives the individual
power to resist the state.”16
We envisage two main types of such blunt disregard of legal obligations: first, carelessness strictly
speaking, where the authority of law is simply ignored; second, simple administrative or governmental
disarray, where a government is unable to have the rule of law respected in its country. In the first
type, disregard is by design. In the second type, disregard is merely by e↵ect.
Investment arbitration would, then, be used to stimulate or react to the absence of “good and
orderly state administration and the protection of rights and other deserving interests”, as is often
claimed in the law literature.17 We consider that such situations would typically translate as poor
institutional conditions.
This leads us to our first hypothesis: arbitration claims are more likely to target states with poor
institutional conditions than those with good institutional conditions.
In previous work making descriptive use of our dataset, we provided mixed empirical evidence for
this theoretical proposition.18 For the period up to the mid-nineties, the data the idea reasonably
plausible that investment arbitration was indeed used mainly to respond to situations of poor gov-
ernance, where governments simply bluntly disregard their legal commitments, by design or e↵ect.
However, in the mid-to-late nineties when investment arbitration claims became more frequent, the
situation somewhat shifted. Since then, investment arbitrations have been filed against governments
exhibiting, on average, a relatively high level of democratic development and rule of law.19 Given
that the use of investment arbitration has really taken o↵ in the mid-to-late nineties, with the vast
majority of cases having been filed between the mid-to-late nineties and today, the overall plausibility
of that hypothesis is low inasmuch as we consider investment arbitration globally, as a whole.
Nevertheless, through time there has been an increasing tendency toward a skewed distribution of
cases with some clustering at the bottom and upper echelons of the level of democratic government and
rule of law. It thus remains plausible that compensating for poor institutional conditions in countries
that have a weak rule of law tradition remains a function of certain arbitrations, as an important
part of investment arbitration still target such countries, while another important part of investment
arbitration are aimed at countries with a high level of respect for the rule of law. In other words,
for the post-late-nineties period our data may suggest a dualization of the function of investment
arbitration. But, clearly, one needs to go beyond descriptive statistics, a task that we turn to in this
16Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring: Law, Distribution and Gender in Market Reform, Kluwer, 2002,
67.
17Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, “Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equi-
table Treatment, Proportionality, and the Emerging Global Administrative Law”, Institute for International
Law and Justice, NYU Law School, Working Paper 2009/6 (Global Administrative Law Series), p. 8,
http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2009-6.KingsburySchill.pdf.
18For more details see Schultz and Dupont (2014).
19A parallel may be drawn with Beth Simmons, “The International Investment Regime since the 1980s: A Transna-
tional “Hands-Tying” Regime for International Investment”, conference paper, 2011 Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, September 1-4, 2011, who found that the average polity score of states seeking annulment
of an ICSID award, up to 2008, was 2 on a scale of 10 (scale and source of information undisclosed in the conference
paper), and it shot up to 6 on the same scale after 2008. The parallel has its limits though, since the reasons for a state
to file annulment proceedings (Simmonss study) are starkly di↵erent from the reasons for an investor to file a claim
(our study).
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paper.
Economic crisis and arbitration
Investment arbitration may also be used to respond to the third type of political risk identified
above: severe economic conditions. How states react to severe economic conditions is documented in
a rich literature. In hard economic times, governments face strong political pressures from citizens,
political parties and pressure groups. Political, economic and social domestic actors use all available
institutionalized channels, and oftentimes manifest themselves in the protest arena, in order to push
for the adoption of immediate, and sometimes radical, policy responses to the crisis.
Governments have of course reacted di↵erently to such pressures, depending on a host of economic,
social and political factors. But one type of reaction traverses most fault lines: market intervention.20
Such market intervention primarily aims at helping domestic interest often with negative e↵ects (direct
or indirect) on foreign investors.
Another significant feature of acute economic crises is the di culty governments face in adopting
policy responses that appropriately address core concerns of domestic actors. Failures in such attempts
have led to episodes of government change,21 or even to political regime change.22 Such changes plainly
put foreign investors at risk in the short run, although they may lead to better conditions over the
medium or long run.
In seems reasonable to infer two simple points from these debates. First, in times of economic
crises, governments often have to adopt quick measures that are very likely to hurt, inadvertently or
intentionally, the rights and interest of foreign investors.23 Second, given the political dynamics that
follows severe economic crises, governments have a hard time quickly reverting to “normal” behavior,
thus making it unlikely that foreign investors can find acceptable arrangements to redress harm caused
by policy change.
This leads us to our second hypothesis: severe economic crises are prone to lead to the filing of
arbitration claims by foreign investors. Put di↵erently, arbitration claims are more likely to target
states that recently su↵ered a severe economic slowdown than those with stable economic conditions.
20See Gourevitch (1986) and more recently Nancy Bermeo and Jonas Pontusson, eds. Coping with Crisis: Government
Reactions to the Great Recession. New York: Russel Sage Foundation (2012).
21Recent work on the great economic recession shows that electoral processes in 30 European countries since 2008
strongly confirm the major finding of the literature on economic voting that incumbents are voted out in elections in
times of economic recessions. Given that the recession is particularly severe, and in most countries clearly attributed to
governments, the e↵ect on incumbents has been particularly strong and fast. In countries with more than one electoral
process since 2008 and ongoing acute economic slump, the interesting result is the tendency to choose outside of main
parties, including radical, “anti-parties” or to abstain (Kriesi, Hanspeter. The Political Consequences of the Financial
and Economic Crisis in Europe: Electoral Punishment and Popular Protest Swiss Political Science Review, 18(4) 2012).
22Gasiorowski, Mark J. Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis. American Political
Science Review, 89 (4): 882-897 (1995); MacIntyre, Andrew. “The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia.”
International Organization 55(1): 81-122 (2001); Pepinsky, Thomas B. “The Global Economic Crisis and the Politics of
Non-Transitions,” Government and Opposition 47(2): 135-161 (2012); Remmmer, Karen L. “Democracy and Economic
Crisis: the Latin American Experience.” World Politics 42(3): 315-335 (1990).
23The recent financial crisis in Cyprus is a case in point: the government bail-in measures explicitly targeted foreign,
in that case Russian, bank depositors.
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Research design
Dataset and variables
We first run an ordinal logistic regression in order to investigate the propositions discussed in the
previous section. The models analyze the likelihood of a variation in the frequency of the number of
arbitration claims per country per year. We then employ a negative binomial regression to test the
same hypotheses with a count model.
The current study draws on a dataset of 775 investment arbitration claims, filed between 1972
(year the first investment claim was filed with ICSID24) and 2014.25 The unit of analysis used here is
claims — not awards since certain claims end in a negotiated agreement or are withdrawn, and not
cases since the definitional ambiguity of that concept is greater than that of claims.26
Our study relates to investment arbitration in general, also called investor-state arbitration. We
thus go beyond investment treaty arbitration, which encompasses only investment arbitration based
on an international treaty (typically a bilateral investment treaty (BIT)). Our dataset thus includes
arbitration claims based on a treaty (bilateral or multilateral), or a contract between the host state
and the investor, or the domestic investment law of the host state of the investment.
The study is further concerned with all types of investment arbitration in the sense that the
dataset covers claims filed under the rules of all relevant arbitration institutions (mainly the World
Bank’s International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the Permanent Court
of Arbitration (PCA), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce (SCC)) as well as ad hoc arbitrations (primarily conducted under the rules of the United
Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
Based on the experience of the second author and on informal consultations with other researchers
and practitioners, this universe of claims appears to be close to a complete picture of all investment
arbitrations filed during that period. It seems reasonable to estimate that no more than 10% of the
existing investment claims are missing in our dataset, given that few arbitration cases remain entirely
secret and no information about them ever leaks somehow to the public.
These 775 claims were encoded in the dataset according to the year in which they were filed (see
Annex 1 for a short description of dimensions that are encoded per claim).27 Figure 1 shows the
evolution of claims filed between 1972 and 2014 It is noteworthy that the number of claims filed
annually significantly increased starting in the mid-to-late nineties — a period during which the
investment arbitration system “shifted gears”, which is correlated, as we will see, to a number of
significant systemic changes in investment arbitration.
24Holiday Inns S.A. and others v. Morocco (ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1).
25The dataset was initially compiled by a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Geneva, Dr Leonila Guglya, It
has since then been revised (and expanded) by the authors and further updates will extend the coverage to claims filed
in 2015.
26A “claim” is a request for arbitration filed by a claimant with an arbitration institution (such as ICSID), or a
notification of the initiation of an arbitration sent to the respondent if no arbitration institution is involved (in ad hoc
arbitrations). A “case” is a loose term, typically designating two specific parties and a broad set of facts. A “case”
may include more than one “claim”, possibly filed with di↵erent arbitration institutions. A “claim” may include several
consolidated “cases”.
27Encoding of 775 claims does not mean, however, that we have been able to code fully all dimensions of those claims.
For instance, we have not been able to reliably identify either claimants or respondents for 30 claims.
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Figure 1: Number of investment arbitrations claims filed per year
The sources of the data collected were as broad as possible. The dataset includes all cases about
which information was found either directly in an award, or indirectly in other datasets and reports of
law firms and of specialized journalists.28 We thus decided to focus on scope and statistical relevance,
accepting a small loss in reliability and accuracy due to the use of secondary sources.
Our dependent variable is the number of arbitration claims per country per year. It is derived
directly from our dataset. To make it more operational, for the logistic regression, we transform it
into a categorical variable that scores 0 if either (a) there is no claim in a given year or if (b) there is
only one isolated claim. An isolated claim is defined as single country/year claim without any claim
in the preceding and following four years. The variable scores 1 for country/year observations with
either one non-isolated claim or two claims. It scores 2 for country/year observations with 3 or more
claims, meaning that 3 or more claims were filed that year against a given country.
This choice of a categorical variable both captures some variation in the magnitude of the number of
claims while controlling for the long tail in the distribution of the number of claims per country/year.29
Another specificity of the data, clearly visible in Figure 1, is the high concentration of claims in
the period 1995-2014. Given that the preceding period includes only 34 claims over 23 years and is
generally considered to be the dormant period of investment arbitration, we restrict our empirical
analysis to the period 1995-2012 (the analysis does not include 2013 and 2014, as we have data for
ICRG scores until 2012, thus for consistency purposes the regressions are run for the other independent
28For more details on the specific sources, see Annex 1 and Schultz and Dupont (2014).
29The number of claims per country/year observation is mostly one (260) with a quick decrease for two claims a year
(66), three claims a year (19), four claims (15) to then drop to one or two cases of 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 claims a year.
Up to 2012, there was only one observation with more claims, that is, Argentina with the record 22 claims in 2003.
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variables with the same time frame). The total number of observations is 2034 with a distribution of
1720/270/44 in the zero, one and two category respectively. We also use a further restricted dataset
that gets rid of countries targeted only once during the whole period. In such cases, the informational
asymmetry (see Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons (2006), discussed above) may indeed be valid, as
well as many other idiosyncratic factors. In other words, for a state to become a respondent in an
arbitration once in eighteen years is something that may well just happen, just as an average driver
occasionally gets a ticket, without the event telling us anything about the behavior of the state, or
the driver. This reduced dataset includes 1368 observations with a distribution of 1067/214/87. The
number of countries included in the base dataset is 113 and drops to 76 in the reduced dataset. This
already tends to suggest that there are only 76 countries in which something out of the plainly ordinary
happened in the 1995-2012 period that triggered a reaction by investors.
Independent variables
Independent variables for governance
Our first hypothesis, as we said, suggests that investment arbitration is more likely to target countries
with poor institutional conditions. We conceptualize this variable by relying on three composite
indices of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).
We first assess the quality of domestic legal and judicial institutions through the WGI Rule of Law
index, which ‘captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and
the courts.’30 In other words, we take it to measure to what extent domestic legal institutions are able
or willing to provide an independent and fair assessment, and potentially a remedy, for an interference
with an investment. The index measures the perception of the quality of domestic legal institutions,
rather than their objective quality. Yet, an investor that merely perceives these institutions to be
deficient may also be more likely to seek remedy for any interference with his investment by presenting
a claim to an international investment tribunal.
Secondly, we consider whether domestic institutions may interfere with an investment by design.
We assess this scenario by looking at the WGI Regulatory Quality index, a business-friendliness
measure that captures ‘the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies
and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.’31 Rather than measuring the
capacity of domestic institutions to adequately respond to an investment interference, this index would
point out the likelihood of the interference itself.
Thirdly, we look at the WGI Corruption index, which captures “perceptions of the extent to which
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well
as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.”32 We use all indicators without lagging their
e↵ects. We decided not to lag their e↵ects, despite our argument that investment arbitration is the
result of serious governmental misconduct in preceding years, for two reasons. First, the indicators
are relatively stable. Lagging their e↵ect is unlikely to produce any significant di↵erence for the
30WGI Methodology, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/rl.pdf> (last accessed on 10 March 2015).
31Ibid.
32Ibid.
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descriptive type of analysis performed here. Second, it is unclear to which extent past and current
domestic institutional conditions respectively a↵ect the decisions of investors to give up alternative
ways to settle a dispute and use arbitration. True, poor institutional conditions in the past are likely
to have led to the dispute. However, ongoing poor institutional conditions are likely to continue to
indicate that any deal with the government is risky.
Apart from the abovementioned indices, we also consider some other prominent indicators to
compare our results. The ICRG Law and Order score is a widely recognized proxy for the strength
of the rule of law. It is a combination of two factors – namely, “Law”, which is an “assessment of
the strength and impartiality of the legal system”, and “Order”, which is an “assessment of popular
observance of the law.”33 The Law and Order variable ranges from 0 to 6 with lower scores indicating
a less established legal system. The use of the Polity IV score (scale -10 to 10) brings a di↵erent
perspective on the institutional situation in host countries. In a more authoritarian country, policy
and legal changes can clearly be more sudden and swifter. This translates into potential political
risk.34
Independent variables for economic crises
Our other hypothesis posits that investment arbitration is more likely to target countries that have
gone through severe economic situations. We conceptualize this variable with GDP growth rates using
the National Accounts Main Aggregates Database from the UN Statistics Division, as this database
has only few missing values for the countries and time period covered by our dataset, unlike the World
Bank database for instance, where we would get missing data for Argentina, which is one of the key
cases in this research. We consider that growth rates best capture the idea of overall general economic
di culty that may result from a host of di↵erent economic factors. As such, for our purposes, growth
rates appear to be a more appropriate indicator than more specific variables, such as the average price
of main export commodities, data on public finance or unemployment.35 Following Simmons’ 2014
study that found a positive correlation between inflation and litigation, we also consider inflation
rate as a measure of economic hardship. According to the results of a random-e↵ects generalized
least squares regression employed, she concludes that “the higher the (log of) inflation, the greater
the probability of arbitration in two years later.”36 In this context, we look at percentage change in
consumer price index (International Financial Statistics data) between 1995-2012.
In contrast to our strategy for the independent variables on institutional conditions, we lag the
e↵ect of growth rates on our categorical dependent variable, using alternatively a 3 and 4 years lag.
Such a lag is necessary because investment arbitrations are typically not filed immediately after the
litigious event occur, and much less immediately after the financial di culty hits. It is much more
typical that a financial di culty hits a country, sometime later the government takes measures that
33International Country Risk Guide, Researcher Dataset (ICRG T3B - Political Risk, ICRG Methodology,
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG Methodology.aspx.).
34Monty G. Marshall, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2012,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
35The use of unemployment figures would require to carefully consider the social automatic stabilizers. Data on public
finance and inflation would require a clearly longer view on economic performance.
36Beth A. Simmons, (2014). “Bargaining over BITs, Arbitrating Awards: The Regime for Protection and Promotion
of International Investment,” World Politics, 66(1): 30.
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harm investors, and again some time later, when dissuasion and amicable dispute settlement have
proven unsuccessful, the investor files the arbitration claim. In addition, many investment agreements
provide for a so-called freezing or cool-o↵ period. This forces the claimant to wait (or negotiate) for 6
to 12 months, starting from the moment the government is notified of the investors intent to resort to
formal dispute settlement mechanisms, before the arbitration claim can legally be filed. We estimate
this period, between the occurrence of an economic slowdown and the filing of an arbitration that
would ensue, to amount to 3 to 4 years.
Admittedly, one could make the argument that growth rates at the time of the filing of a claim may
also have some influence. No lag should therefore be used. One could indeed consider that countries
that had bad conditions both in the past (leading to the litigious policy decisions) and in the present
are the least likely to sincerely negotiate with investors. The latter may, then, have no other option to
quit or litigate. Countries with bad economic conditions “only” in the past, conversely, may be more
willing to engage in such sincere negotiations. This is, however, a very speculative argument that we
choose to preliminary investigate empirically in this paper.
Control strategy
We control for some conditions or factors that may a↵ect the relationship between our dependent
and independent variables. First, we use a dummy variable to control for the existence of ongoing
IMF programs in the investment host countries. Such programs come with conditions that tend to
severely limit the discretion of governments and tend to act as seals of guarantee of sound, market
friendly behavior. From this perspective, one could expect that international investors may be less
tempted to resort to international arbitration against countries that have ongoing IMF programs.
It seems reasonably plausible that countries su↵ering from an economic slowdown are on average
softer on foreign investors if they are in an IMF program than if they are not, because of constraints
imposed by the IMF. Besides, as Broz points out “[e]xternal monitoring by the IMF might create
the transparency necessary to make a monetary commitment credible,”37 As a matter of fact, the
IMF monitoring has significant impacts regarding credible commitments. Even if a country has severe
domestic economic problems, the implementation of a stability program led and engineered by the
IMF may render the country credible, as it is usually perceived as a sign that the country is on the
right track, which usually avoids speculative attacks on its currency as well. The dummy variable
takes the value of one if the country is borrowing from the Fund.38
Second, we address the issue of the alleged tendency in arbitration to target poorer countries
by controlling for the level of economic development.39 As highlighted in previous work using only
descriptive statistics (Schultz and Dupont 2014), there is no evidence that states with low levels of
economic development have been more frequently targeted than states with higher levels of economic
development. In absolute numbers, states on the higher end of economic development have been
37Lawrence Broz, “Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes,” International Organization
56, no. 4 (2002): 884.
38Information, accessible on the website http://www.imf.org/external/country/index.htm, together with the Fund’s
MONA (Monitoring of Fund Arrangements) database.
39Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, “Toward Normlessness: The Ravage and Retreat of Neo-Liberalism in Interna-
tional Investment Law” 2 Yearbook of International Investment Law & Policy 595 (2010), 618↵.
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respondents in more arbitrations than states on the lower end of economic development. Neverthe-
less, we remain to investigate whether there is some evidence of the curvilinear relationship between
expropriation and the level of development, as would be suggested by earlier work on foreign direct
investment. Indeed, a study examining expropriations in the 1970s found that the highest number
of expropriations took place in countries with medium scores of economic development. Hence, we
may expect the greatest number of arbitrations to take place against states in this range of economic
development.40 We use the World Bank income level four-fold classification: low income, lower-middle
income, upper-middle income and high-income countries.41 It is based mainly on gross national in-
come (earlier gross national product) per capita. For the time span of our study, income levels of
countries included in our analysis remain unchanged.
Third, given the large number of claims targeting Latin American and Caribbean countries, we
control for a possible regional e↵ect specific to that part of the world. We use a binary dummy variable
scoring one for Latin American and Caribbean host countries and zero for countries from the rest of
world. One possible interpretation for a regional specific pattern would be a stronger influence of
economic ideology on governments’ reactions to economic di culties, leading to severe strains with
foreign investors. Given the high number of claims against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
but also against Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina, the economic ideology factor should be investigated
and controlled for (there are 15 Latin American or Caribbean countries in our data). But this would
properly require a fuller investigation, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Fourth, we control for a possible e↵ect of the sector of activity of the investment to which the
arbitration relates. Given recent evidence that foreign firms seem to be more vulnerable to expropri-
ation in resource-based sectors,42 we use a binary dummy variable that scores one for investment in
the primary sector (agriculture, mining, oil, gas and petroleum).
Fifth, and last, given the high number of claims filed by investors with US nationality, we control
for a possible e↵ect of US nationality. The theoretical proposition could be that investors with US
nationality may have a particularly broad set of options available to address a concern with foreign
governments, given the economic power supremacy of the US. It would then seem to follow that one
could expect arbitration to be less likely to be used by investors with US nationality. This may
particularly be true for host countries that do not belong to the high-income category, because they
are comparatively weaker against the US economic power.
Results
In this section of the paper, we summarize the statistical findings derived by testing our two hypothe-
ses. As mentioned earlier in the paper, first an ordinal logistic regression with a categorical dependent
40See Jodice (1980). The level of economic development no longer features prominently in recent work on expro-
priation. For instance, Hajzler (2012) focuses on output price levels and Wellhausen (2013) on FDI national diversity
(Christopher Hajzler, “Expropriation of foreign direct investments: sectoral patterns from 1993 to 2006,” Review of
World Economy, 148:119-149 (2012); Rachel Wellhausen, “Expropriation, Nationality and Diplomacy,” Paper presented
at the Annual ISA Meeting, San Francisco, April 2013).
41The distinction between lower-middle and upper-middle income was introduced in 1983; until then there was just
one “middle income” category.
42Hajzler (2012).
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variable (consisting three categories for the number of arbitration claims per country per year) is em-
ployed, essentially using maximum likelihood estimation. We proceed with a baseline model regressing
the primary predictor variables, and then we rerun our analyses with the controls for the income, and
IMF loan and Latin America dummy variables, and we also lag the e↵ect of growth rates and inflation
on our outcome variable, using a 3 and 4 years lag to see if these yield significant e↵ects (see Table
1 in Annex 2). We then run the same models this time excluding the host countries with only one
arbitration claim over the whole period (see Table 2 in Annex 2). The same regressions are run again
for all countries, excluding first the cases with US investors (see Table 3 in Annex 2) and then Primary
sector (see Table 4 in Annex 2). We then run the regressions excluding the host countries with only
one claim (see Table 5 and Table 6 in Annex 2).
The degree of bias is strongly dependent on the number of cases in the less frequent category in
maximum likelihood estimation, and since 1720 of our 2034 observations are coded as 0, we acknowl-
edge the possibility of some bias. In this regard, we then employ a negative binomial event count
model, where the dependent variable is the total number arbitration claims a country faces, and the
independent variables stay the same43 (see Table 7 in Annex 2).
Overall, we find no strong evidence that poor institutional conditions, when measured by Polity
and ICRG scores, are significantly associated with investment arbitration claims. Likewise, GDP
growth stays statistically insignificant in the majority of the models (GDP is significant at 0.1 level
in some of them), though they do have a negative relation in all models, as expected. Inflation does
not have a statistically significant relation with the dependent variable either.
However, WGI Corruption and WGI Rule of Law are statistically significant when we run the
regressions for all countries, and they both have a negative relation with investment arbitration claims,
as expected. WGI Regulatory Quality has a negative relation too, though it is only significant at 0.1
level. For most of the models, adding an interaction e↵ect of GDP growth and variables measuring
institutional conditions does not improve goodness of fit. Lagging GDP growth does not change the
results significantly either.
We also tried introducing the terms separately, in case there is multicollinearity and partial concep-
tual overlap between GDP growth and Polity and ICRG scores, again containing the control variables.
They again stay insignificant in the majority of the cases. Assuming that the large number of host
countries with only one claim might be a reason for this result, we rerun the same regressions this
time excluding the aforesaid cases, however, we do not detect a drastic change in terms of statistical
significance.
As discussed earlier, we are controlling for certain variables, and in order to see if we actually
get statistically significant results consistent with the literature on our control variables, we also run
a basic model with regressing the control variables on our dependent variable. Consistent with our
discussion, countries receiving IMF loans have a lower probability of facing investment arbitration,
and the indicator is statistically significant in the majority of the cases,44 whereas the Income and
Latin America variables have a positive relation with investment arbitration claims, as expected; Latin
America mostly yields significant e↵ects at 0.1 level, while Income is statistically significant at 0.01
43We employ a standard negative binomial regression model that allows for overdispersion, instead of a zero inflated
Poisson (ZIP), is as it fits much better than a ZIP model.
44Except when we run negative binomial regression, we lose significance of the IMF variable.
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level in most of the models.
Rerunning the regressions after excluding the cases with US investors and then Primary sector
does not lead to a substantial change for the models with all countries, while the restricted models
decrease statistical significance considerably.
As a result, we do not detect any strong and stable relation between GDP growth, inflation, WGI
Regulatory Quality, Polity and ICRG scores and our dependent variable, while the WGI Corruption
and WGI Rule of Law have a negative and statistically significant relation with it.
Conclusion
International investors are now regularly using the means of last resort that investment arbitration
is in order to redress harmful situations occurring in host countries. In this paper, we investigate
to which extent such arbitration claims are related to the materialization of two types of sources of
political risk, namely severe economic situations and poor institutional conditions in host countries.
We do so while explicitly keeping the predictors simple, even simplistic, and restricting the set of
observations to those countries that have been targeted by investment claims more than once in the
period 1995-2012. The result of our paper is that only one leg of our conceptual depiction of political
risk and arbitration — namely corruption and lack of rule of law making dissuasion fail and thus
leading to arbitrations — seems to have statistical significance. We can surely find claims in line with
the other leg but the link seems statistically tenuous.
Yet we also have reasons to question our finding and continue empirical investigations along di↵er-
ent lines. First, the choice of GDP growth as indicator of possible severe economic conditions is clearly
overly simplistic. We need to explicitly capture the duration of economic crises. Some of the mostly
used indices on such crises, however, need to be extended to all countries in our dataset. Second,
given that the primary sector seems to be correlated with higher number of arbitration claims, we
need to carefully investigate a possible third type of political risk, resource nationalism, or economic
nationalism more broadly. In a recently published piece focusing only on claims in the oil and gas
sector, we indeed found evidence that economic nationalism is often associated with the bringing of
arbitration claims, but we need to expand the analysis to the whole dataset and moreover address the
challenge of the most appropriate indicators for economic nationalism.45
45For details see Ce´dric Dupont, Thomas Schultz, Melanie R. Wahl and Merih Angin, (2015). “Types of Political
Risk Leading to Investment Arbitrations in the Oil and Gas Sector,” Journal of World Energy Law & Business, 8(4):
337-361.
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ANNEX 1: A FEW FACTS ABOUT OUR DATABASE
This study is based on a data set with the following characteristics:
• Period covered: 1972-2014
• Includes 775 investment awards (661 until 2012)
• Includes investment awards regardless of the jurisdictional basis of the arbitration:
– investment arbitrations based on a treaty (typically a BIT, but not on multilateral treaties);
– investment arbitrations based on a contract between the host state and the investor,
– investment arbitrations based on the domestic legislation of the host state, when such
legislation unilaterally allows the investor to file an arbitration against the government.
• Includes institutional investment arbitration (ICSID mainly, but also Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce, International Chamber of Commerce, etc) and ad hoc investment arbitration (mainly
under the arbitration rules of UNCITRAL).
• Encodes the following aspects of the arbitrations:
– parties; case number; case status (pending/concluded/never commenced); composition of
the arbitral tribunal (names of arbitrators); name of host state and home state of investor;
region of the world of host state and home state of investor; year of filing; in favor of
whom the initial award was rendered; arbitration rules governing the procedure; sector
of the economy invested in (Agriculture, Banking and Finance, Construction, Electricity
generation and distribution, Forestry, Hotels/Tourism/Recreation, Industry (chemicals),
Industry (food), Industry (metals), Industry (other light), Industry (textiles), Industry
(transport and machinery), Industry (weapons), Insurance, Media and Broadcasting, Min-
ing, Oil/gas/petroleum, Pharmaceuticals, Real Estate Development, Sales and Trade, Ser-
vices, Telecom, Transportation and infrastructure, Waste Management and Utilities, Water
and Sewer); type of host country action attacked; amount claimed; most recent procedural
position; year of conclusion of case if applicable; years pending; if settled, phase of the pro-
ceedings when the settlement has taken place/reason; damages awarded; percentage of the
claim ultimately awarded; polity score of host state and home state (year of filing) (Polity
IV Country Reports 2009); development status of host state (year of filing) (World Bank
World Development Reports); number of arbitrators; nationalities of arbitrators; region
of origin of arbitrators; development status of arbitrators state of nationality; annulment
proceedings (ICSID only): outcome, duration, committee members.
• Sources of information:
– For claims submitted to ICSID: ICSID website and ICSID Reports.
– For other claims, sources include: italaw.com website; UNCTAD reports; Investment Ar-
bitration Reporter website; Oxford University Press’s Investment Claims website; Kluw-
erarbitration.com; Westlaw database; Global Arbitration Review; NAFTA Secretariat’s
17
database; naftaclaims.com; ICC Dispute Resolution library; website of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce; website of the Energy Charter Treaty secretariat; general newspa-
pers; portfolios of law firms and arbitrators.
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ANNEX 2: Regression Results
Table 1: Ordinal Logistic Regression Results for all countries
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Variable
GDP growth - -0.021* [0.011] -0.02* [0.011] -0.021* [0.011] - - -
WGI Corruption - -0.27*** [0.102] - - -0.27*** [0.102] - -
WGI Regulatory Qual - - -0.182* [0.102] - - -0.180* [0.102] -
WGI Rule of Law - - - -0.286*** [0.104] - - -0.28*** [0.104]
GDP growth (t-3) - - - - -0.017* [0.01] -0.016* [0.01] -0.016* [0.01]
Income 0.206*** [0.064] 0.312*** [0.091] 0.266*** [0.096] 0.329*** [0.095] 0.317*** [0.092] 0.271*** [0.096] 0.333*** [0.095]
IMF loan -0.394*** [0.155] -0.424*** [0.166] -0.404** [0.167] -0.43*** [0.166] -0.43*** [0.166] -0.403** [0.167] -0.42*** [0.166]
Latin America 0.251* [0.149] 0.275* [0.159] 0.283* [0.159] 0.224 [0.16] 0.276* [0.159] 0.285* [0.159] 0.226 [0.16]
Summary statistics
No. of observations 2034 1555 1552 1556 1553 1551 1555
Pseudo R squared 0.024 0.031 0.028 0.031 0.030 0.027 0.030
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors; *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. Ordinal logistic regression performed using SPSS Statistics
23.
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Table 2: Ordinal Logistic Regression Results for the host countries with more than one investment arbitration case
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Variable
GDP growth - -0.003 [0.014] -0.005 [0.014] -0.004 [0.014] - - -
WGI Corruption - -0.122 [0.112] - - -0.143 [0.113] - -
WGI Regulatory Qual - - -0.188* [0.113] - - -0.206* [0.113] -
WGI Rule of Law - - - -0.139 [0.112] - - -0.153 [0.112]
GDP growth (t-3) - - - - -0.017* [0.011] -0.017* [0.011] -0.016* [0.011]
Income 0.282*** [0.071] 0.322*** [0.097] 0.376*** [0.105] 0.337*** [0.1] 0.332*** [0.098] 0.388*** [0.106] 0.344*** [0.101]
IMF loan -0.341** [0.159] -0.3* [0.173] -0.28* [0.172] -0.3* [0.173] -0.33* [0.174] -0.302* [0.173] -0.325* [0.173]
Latin America 0.263* [0.157] 0.306* [0.169] 0.303* [0.169] 0.275* [0.17] 0.301* [0.169] 0.299* [0.169] 0.227* [0.17]
Summary statistics
No. of observations 1368 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
Pseudo R squared 0.032 0.031 0.033 0.031 0.034 0.036 0.034
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors; *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. Ordinal logistic regression performed using SPSS Statistics
23.
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Table 3: Ordinal Logistic Regression Results for all countries excluding the cases with US investors
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Variable
GDP growth - -0.02* [0.011] -0.019* [0.011] -0.02* [0.011] - - -
WGI Corruption - -0.233** [0.101] - - -0.236** [0.102] - -
WGI Regulatory Qual - - -0.138 [0.103] - - -0.138 [0.103] -
WGI Rule of Law - - - -0.242** [0.104] - - -0.24** [0.104]
GDP growth (t-3) - - - - -0.018* [0.011] -0.016* [0.011] -0.017* [0.011]
Income 0.209*** [0.064] 0.288*** [0.091] 0.237*** [0.096] 0.3*** [0.095] 0.295*** [0.092] 0.244*** [0.096] 0.305*** [0.095]
IMF loan -0.383*** [0.154] -0.406*** [0.166] -0.394** [0.167] -0.408*** [0.166] -0.41*** [0.166] -0.394** [0.167] -0.41*** [0.166]
Latin America 0.223* [0.149] 0.244* [0.159] 0.249* [0.159] 0.197 [0.16] 0.246* [0.159] 0.251* [0.159] 0.2 [0.16]
Summary statistics
No. of observations 2034 1555 1552 1556 1553 1551 1555
Pseudo R squared 0.023 0.031 0.025 0.028 0.027 0.024 0.027
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors; *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. Ordinal logistic regression performed using SPSS Statistics
23.
21
Table 4: Ordinal Logistic Regression Results for all countries excluding the cases with Primary sector
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Variable
GDP growth - -0.02* [0.011] -0.019* [0.011] -0.02* [0.011] - - -
WGI Corruption - -0.252*** [0.102] - - -0.26*** [0.102] - -
WGI Regulatory Qual - - -0.163* [0.103] - - -0.163* [0.102] -
WGI Rule of Law - - - -0.264*** [0.104] - - -0.26*** [0.104]
GDP growth (t-3) - - - - -0.017* [0.01] -0.016* [0.01] -0.016* [0.01]
Income 0.19*** [0.064] 0.279*** [0.091] 0.232** [0.095] 0.293*** [0.095] 0.287*** [0.092] 0.24*** [0.096] 0.3*** [0.095]
IMF loan -0.405*** [0.155] -0.432*** [0.166] -0.416*** [0.167] -0.434*** [0.166] -0.43*** [0.166] -0.415** [0.167] -0.43*** [0.166]
Latin America 0.236* [0.149] 0.245* [0.159] 0.255* [0.159] 0.196 [0.16] 0.247* [0.159] 0.258* [0.159] 0.2 [0.16]
Summary statistics
No. of observations 2034 1555 1552 1556 1553 1551 1555
Pseudo R squared 0.022 0.027 0.024 0.027 0.027 0.023 0.027
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors; *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. Ordinal logistic regression performed using SPSS Statistics
23.
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Table 5: Ordinal Logistic Regression Results for the host countries with more than one investment arbitration case, excluding the cases with
US investors
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Variable
GDP growth - -0.003 [0.014] -0.004 [0.014] -0.003 [0.014] - - -
WGI Corruption - -0.063 [0.112] - - -0.086 [0.113] - -
WGI Regulatory Qual - - -0.118 [0.114] - - -0.137 [0.114] -
WGI Rule of Law - - - -0.08 [0.112] - - -0.096 [0.112]
GDP growth (t-3) - - - - -0.018* [0.01] -0.018* [0.011] -0.018* [0.011]
Income 0.285*** [0.071] 0.287*** [0.097] 0.328*** [0.105] 0.299*** [0.1] 0.296*** [0.098] 0.338*** [0.106] 0.306*** [0.101]
IMF loan -0.323** [0.158] -0.269* [0.172] -0.257* [0.172] -0.27* [0.172] -0.295* [0.173] -0.279* [0.172] -0.295* [0.173]
Latin America 0.217 [0.157] 0.256* [0.169] 0.251* [0.169] 0.237 [0.17] 0.251* [0.169] 0.246 [0.169] 0.229 [0.17]
Summary statistics
No. of observations 1368 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
Pseudo R squared 0.030 0.027 0.028 0.027 0.030 0.031 0.030
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors; *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. Ordinal logistic regression performed using SPSS Statistics
23.
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Table 6: Ordinal Logistic Regression Results for the host countries with more than one investment arbitration case, excluding the cases with
Primary sector
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Variable
GDP growth - -0.001 [0.014] -0.001 [0.014] 0 [0.014] - - -
WGI Corruption - -0.107 [0.112] - - -0.131 [0.113] - -
WGI Regulatory Qual - - -0.159 [0.113] - - -0.181* [0.113] -
WGI Rule of Law - - - -0.118 [0.112] - - -0.137 [0.112]
GDP growth (t-3) - - - - -0.017* [0.011] -0.017* [0.011] -0.016* [0.011]
Income 0.257*** [0.071] 0.286*** [0.097] 0.329*** [0.104] 0.297*** [0.1] 0.294*** [0.098] 0.340*** [0.105] 0.303*** [0.101]
IMF loan -0.351** [0.158] -0.298* [0.172] -0.28* [0.172] -0.298* [0.172] -0.33* [0.173] -0.307* [0.172] -0.328* [0.173]
Latin America 0.234* [0.157] 0.264* [0.169] 0.259* [0.169] 0.237 [0.17] 0.255* [0.169] 0.251* [0.169] 0.225 [0.17]
Summary statistics
No. of observations 1368 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
Pseudo R squared 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.028 0.029 0.028
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors; *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. Ordinal logistic regression performed using SPSS Statistics
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Table 7: Negative Binomial Regression Results
Model 1 2 3 4
Arbitration claims Arbitration claims Arbitration claims Arbitration claims
Variable (all cases) (excluding Primary sector) (all cases) (excluding Primary sector)
GDP growth -0.006 [0.008] -0.009 [0.01] -0.006 [0.008] -0.009 [0.01]
WGI Corruption -0.3*** [0.079] -0.233*** [0.09] - -
WGI Rule of Law - - -0.369*** [0.08] -0.245*** [0.089]
Income 0.386*** [0.075] 0.48*** [0.09] 0.436*** [0.075] 0.491*** [0.08]
IMF loan -0.151 [0.124] -0.07 [0.141] -0.153 [0.124] -0.072 [0.141]
Latin America 0.611*** [0.115] 0.482*** [0.131] 0.507*** [0.119] 0.422*** [0.134]
Summary statistics
No. of observations 1555 1555 1556 1556
Log-likelihood -1153.102 -947.991 -1150.444 -948.451
Pearson  2 2666.633 2626.37 2633.96 2634.628
Numbers in brackets represent standard errors; *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. Negative binomial regression performed using SPSS
Statistics 23.
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